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FIDELITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
ASPIRATIONS
Sotirios A. Barber*
N his contribution to this Symposium Professor Balkin cautions
writers who emphasize constitutional aspirations not to ignore the
historical deals and the positive constitutional doctrines that protected
and still protect some large injustices in America.' This is good ad-
vice. Because one aspires to become what one is not, aspirations have
a mixed structure. They can't help giving some expression to one's
worse self along with one's better self. As an aspirational expression,
the Constitution speaks for a culture whose aspirations presuppose its
imperfections, and the Constitution may well be imperfect by its own
standards. It can be expected to give legal form some of the very vices
whose causes it would cure or whose effects it would control.
As inseparable as the noble and the base aspects of our constitu-
tional politics may be, constitutional interpretation should take its gui-
dance from "the better angels of our nature." Constitutional
interpretation seeks to make sense of a text, and making sense of a
prescriptive political text requires relating it to some plausible and at-
tractive version of the common good. You might say that interpreting
the Constitution is a way of trying to make it, and therefore the na-
tion, look good. And the ends of interpretation should shift its focus
away from sources like legislative histories and the notes of constitu-
tional conventions and toward preambulatory statements and public-
spirited theories of the Constitution like those in The Federalist and
Lincoln's First Inaugural.
With these observations I would restate and to some extent amend
parts of Professor Balkin's argument:
The ends of constitutional interpretation require that we view the
constitutional text as adumbrating an ideal way of life that defines the
nation's aspirations. Lincoln took such an approach when he argued
that the Constitution put slavery "in the course of ultimate extinction"
and that its original compromises with slavery were the temporary ex-
pedients of an imperfect situation. Fidelity to an aspirational constitu-
tion requires that we confront and overcome the imperfections in
ourselves that the Constitution presupposes, including even provisions
of the constitutional document that might obstruct progress toward
constitutional ends. Thus, to secure union, Lincoln found ways partly
to defeat constitutional barriers to the national government's aboli-
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tion of slavery. When all's said and done, we will find that we all take
some variation of Lincoln's approach to constitutional interpretation.
Consider what's going on when we pretend to view the Constitution
as indifferent to good and evil results-as the edict of some historical
sovereign or as a set of processes (institutional or natural) for achiev-
ing and maintaining any number of states of affairs, including some
that are unjust or evil. Outsiders of various sorts-scientific observ-
ers, for example, some legal "dualists," or political opponents of the
Constitution-may describe the Constitution this way, but these out-
siders can't be true to themselves while interpreting the Constitution
for civic purposes. Proceduralists, originalists, and other insiders who
would interpret the Constitution for the constitutionally faithful have
no option beyond some variation on Lincoln's approach. Procedural-
ists thus assume that on the whole, or on balance, and despite initial
appearances, it really is good to admit opportunities for injustice on
some retail or nonsystemic levels for the sake of some larger ultimate
good, like liberal (read "bourgeois") democracy. And originalists typ-
ically argue that nonoriginalism risks social turmoil and elitist tyranny
that they assume to be worse than the racism, sexism, and economic
injustice that many nonoriginalists would ameliorate.
Try to avoid thinking aspirationally or in terms of praiseworthy re-
sults and you'll either find yourself repairing to a metaethics that ex-
cuses you from assessing political phenomena in moral terms, or you'll
find yourself saying one thing and believing another about what is just
and good. The metaethical move lands you outside the practice of
constitutional interpretation with nothing relevant to say to those who
think and act inside the practice. And pretending that the unjust is
just brings what Professor Balkin calls cognitive dissonance and prob-
ably an eventual loss of self respect. An aspirationalist understanding
of the Constitution is thus the only one from which one can hope to
justify fidelity to the Constitution.
But an aspirational understanding, properly understood, can't guar-
antee fidelity to the Constitution. Far from it. Our best understand-
ing of the Constitution can still be no more than the prescriptive
counterpart of a mere conception of the good or just society, the end
in whose light the document makes sense. Don't forget that the con-
stitutional document refers to itself in instrumental terms and dedi-
cates itself to ends like justice and the general welfare, not to anyone's
conception thereof. As humanly contrived means to presumably real
ends in an unpredictable world, the Constitution is not merely open to
the possibility of failure; it will fail eventually, and everyone knows it
will fail eventually. Fidelity to the Constitution should therefore be
provisional and contingent on our ability continually to reaffirm it for
what it expressly says it is: an instrument of justice and the general
welfare. In a sense, we can't be faithful to the Constitution; we can at
best only strive to be faithful to the Constitution. Fidelity to this Con-
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stitution means working for the philosophic knowledge, scientific
knowledge, legal and political reform, and concrete social conditions
needed to vindicate the Constitution's claim to be an instrument of
justice and the general welfare. Fidelity turns out to be a very tall
order indeed, too tall for hopes of ultimate success, too tall for any-
thing short of epic tragedy.
What constitutes constitutional failure is a complex and neglected
question of constitutional theory whose answer depends in part on a
successful theory of constitutional ends. At a time when realism and
constructivism in ethics have neutralized skepticism and subjectivism,
I see no compelling reason to conclude that the needed theories are
impossible. Nor is it clear that ideological divisions foreclose a con-
vergence of scholarly opinion on significant aspects of such theories.
We can't know the outcome of our efforts before we make them, espe-
cially since convergence on some issues may be more than merely pos-
sible. One such issue is whether the Constitution is a mere "charter of
negative liberties." The negative-liberties doctrine should be easy to
refute among those willing to debate, and when it is refuted observers
on all sides should be willing to consider whether millions of impover-
ished children, a permanent underclass, and perhaps a permanently
depressed and immobile working class indicate the failure of the Con-
stitution as an instrument of justice and the general welfare.
Described formally, constitutional failure (of one kind) is the inade-
quacy of constitutional means to constitutional ends. Lincoln seemed
to feel, for instance, that because he couldn't act successfully to pre-
serve the Union by honoring the most plausible reading of the power
to suspend habeas corpus, the Constitution obligated him to distort
the provision. Lincoln thus acted as if fidelity to the Constitution de-
manded violation of the Constitution in order to achieve or preserve
the conditions of constitutional authority and coherence. Because
such a judgment may in appropriate circumstances hold for any and
even all operative constitutional provisions, perhaps an important
form of fidelity should be described less in terms of institutional re-
sponsibilities than in terms of practical virtues not fully reducible to
legal form. If so, constitutional theory should reconsider Madison's
proposal for achieving constitutional ends chiefly through a system of
countervailing private incentives. Public-spiritedness, practical vis-
dom, political trust, and their social, economic, and political infra-
structures seem also to be needed.
In the end constitutional fidelity may require the cultivation of cer-
tain human types. As a step toward discovering what types, we might
consider whose fidelity we ourselves would value. We would want
most the fidelity of persons who are fully capable of criticizing us and
moving on to something better. We would need the fidelity of such
people to assure us that we deserve anyone's fidelity. We can't be
confident the Constitution deserves our fidelity unless we believe that
1997] 1759
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we can do better than the Constitution if we have to-unless we be-
lieve that the nation can still produce critics, movements, and resulting
constitutional reforms on the order of those associated with Lincoln if
not Madison.
If we still have the capacities in us, we have a good Constitution,
one that deserves our fidelity. We will know eventually.
